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tHe impact of voter turnout on distriButive 
policY outcomes in Japan
Does voter turnout affect policy outcomes? This long-standing question has been 
re-visited recently with close empirical scrutiny. These studies, however, commonly 
suffer from a problem of omitting variables correlated with both causal and outcome 
variables: specifically, immeasurable political interactions between politicians, organised 
groups, and individual voters. We address this problem by exploiting an instrument 
based on new data measuring the amount of rainfall on the voting day. It is a valid 
instrument not only because it is correlated with voter turnout and uncorrelated 
with politically relevant omitted variables, but also because it is expected to satisfy the 
assumption of ‘homogeneous partial effects,’ which has not been carefully examined 
in previous studies that took advantage of instrumental variables. Using a large, mu-
nicipality-level data set from Japan, we show that the turnout effect on the amounts 
of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is indeed significant, positive, and large.
‘I do not mean to misuse or abuse subsidies from the central government to municipalities. 
However, municipalities with low turnout rates deserve an appropriate penalty and those with 
high turnout rates deserve a reward. This is how democracy works.’ – Japanese Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone1
Introduction
This paper examines a long-standing but recently re-visited question: Does political 
participation affect policy outcomes? More than half a century ago, Schumpeter (1942) 
argued that capitalism, especially the proper conduct of entrepreneurship, was ‘fettered’ by 
the government’s pursuit of interests for those who actively participate (that is, intervene) 
in policy processes. Political scientists, most notably Dahl (1956) and Key (1949), also 
expressed similar concerns. More recently, in his well known presidential address to the 
American Political Science Association, Lijphart (1997) argued that low and declining 
voter turnout is ‘democracy’s unresolved dilemma’ because such ‘unequal participation’ 
would translate into disproportionate influence on policy outcomes.2
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  While Lijphart, as well as earlier scholars, warned of the policy consequences of 
unequal participation primarily on normative grounds, a growing number of recent scholars 
are examining the effects of political participation, specifically voter turnout, from positive 
perspectives (Falaschetti 2003; Fleck 1999; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and 
Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003; Martinez 1997; Mueller and Stratmann 2003). 
In an effort to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of voter turnout, these existing 
studies control relevant covariates using a range of observable variables and fixed effects 
based on the standard regression framework. 
  We consider, however, that these studies fail to control for a variety of crucial fea-
tures of electoral politics, which are often immeasurable. Specifically, voter turnout tends 
to be high when candidates and their supporters attempt to mobilise votes (for example, 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), when such campaign efforts make certain issues prominent 
(for example, Hutchings 2003), and when the public becomes more ‘attentive’ (Martin 
2003) to these issues. In turn, such a rise in public attention devoted to locally politicised 
issues leads policy-makers to allocate a disproportionately larger amount of government 
resources to municipalities with higher turnouts. 
  The existing empirical studies provide mixed results, most likely due to this prob-
lem of omitting relevant variables: specifically, political interactions between politicians, 
organised groups, and individual voters up until the day before the voting day. For example, 
in an empirical study estimating the impacts of voter turnout on the per capita amount of 
federal expenditures in the United States, Martin (2003) shows that voter turnout has a 
significantly positive effect (at the five per cent level) on bi-annual changes in three of six 
two-year cycles from 1984 to 1994 (House-based analysis, Tables 1a and 1b). The effect 
is even negative and significant at the one per cent level in the 1990 and 1992 cycles. As 
Martin (2003) correctly admits, ‘Voter turnout may be acting as a surrogate for other 
omitted characteristics’ (p. 120). 
  In this paper, we circumvent this problem by using the voting-day precipitation 
as an instrumental variable. Rainfall suppresses voter turnout as existing studies suggest 
(Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007; Knack 1994; Tamada 2006), but we can expect 
that it is uncorrelated with the omitted variables. In addition, as we will discuss the matter 
carefully later, the rainfall variable is also expected to satisfy the assumption of ‘homogene-
ous partial effects’, which has not been carefully examined in previous studies that took 
advantage of instrumental variables (Dunning 2008).
  Specifically, using large municipality-level electoral, budgetary, and meteorological 
data from Japan, we estimate the effect of voter turnout on the amounts of intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers of geographically specific projects and programs. We focus on 
this particular policy variable, because political participation is expected to have the most 3
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direct and strongest impacts on distributive policy decisions by legislators, whose space 
for representation and competition is defined by geographically segmented districts. The 
results suggest that the turnout effect is indeed significant, positive, and large. 
Why Voter Turnout Affects Delivery of Benefits
Why does voter turnout affect policy outcomes? Why are the existing estimates expected 
to be biased? In line with our focus on intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Japan, this 
section gives our answers to these questions. Although we limit our discussion to the 
primary research topic, we believe that it is generally applicable to studies that analyse 
the impact of political participation on policy outcomes.
  The standard OLS regression models estimating the impact of voter turnout on 
policy outcomes (with an assumption that one has time-series and cross-section data) can 
be expressed as follows:
i t i i t i t it W X Y ε α δ β + + ⋅ + ⋅ = −1               (1)
The outcome variable  it Y  is the amount of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to municipal-
ity i  in year t . The causal variable  it X  is voter turnout in i  recorded in the most recent 
election as of t . The model also includes other observable pre-treatment variables  1 − it W
, a location-specific fixed effect  i α , and an error term  it ε .
  A standard OLS regression assumes that voter turnout is uncorrelated with the 
error term after conditioning on  1 − it W  and  i α . We assume, however, that even after con-
trolling for these, voter turnout is a sum of the systematic but unobservable component 
( it φ ) and the stochastic component ( it u ); namely, 
i t i j i i t it u W X + = − φ α , 1 .                  (2)
If  it φ  is correlated with the outcome variable  it Y , OLS regressions suffer from the well-
known problem of omitted variable bias. The existing literature on electoral politics sug-
gests that there are ample reasons to believe this. Specifically, we argue that the omitted 
systematic  component  constitutes  political  interactions  between  political  candidates, 
their supporters, and other individual voters during a campaign period. Such interactions 
have effects on voter turnout, and in turn on policy outcomes, through the following 
mechanisms.
  First, during the campaign period, political candidates contact individual vot-
ers by door-to-door canvassing, organising small-group meetings, making phone calls, 
sending direct mailouts, and engaging in other face-to-face activities, and asking them 
to vote in the upcoming election. These so-called ‘get-out-to-vote’ (GOTV) campaigns 
are found to increase voter turnout (for example, Gerber and Green 2000). Candidates 
also mobilise votes indirectly through their core supporters, activists, and other organised 4
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interest groups and social networks (for example, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In the 
Japanese case, municipal politicians (that is, mayors and assembly members) have always 
been important hubs of these activists, and they have served as the faucets at the end of 
‘pipeline of pork’ (Scheiner 2005).
  Second, when candidates contact the electorate and interact with them, the former 
not only ask the latter to vote for them but also try to convince what sorts of policy 
benefits they can deliver to the localities. For example, they may promise to bring fiscal 
resources for specific public projects and programs (for example, municipal roads, irri-
gation projects, and educational facilities). As a result of such campaigns, certain issues 
become more salient, and the electorate, who would otherwise be only weakly motivated 
to acquire information about issues, candidates, and parties (for example, Benett 1995; 
Zaller 1992), become more ‘attentive’ (Martin 2003) to the nature of electoral compe-
tition and more informed about candidates’ policy positions (for example, Brians and 
Wattenberg 1995; Goldstein and Freedman 2002). In the words of Hutchings (2003), 
‘sleeping giants’ are awakened by political campaigns that emphasise their interests. The 
rise in public attention on specific pork-barrel projects further motivates municipal politi-
cians to increase mobilisation efforts. Voters are also more strongly motivated to organise 
votes — asking neighbors, friends and colleagues to vote for specific candidates — with 
the hope that their voices will be better heard by politicians, their preferred projects will 
be implemented, new jobs will be created, and/or politically-general incomes will rise.
  Importantly, the higher level of ‘issue politicisation’ through active campaigns and 
political interactions between candidates and voters not only increases voter turnout, but 
also gives candidates, once elected, stronger incentives to direct larger public expenditures 
to their constituents. An underlying logic is straightforward, although it is not clearly 
stated in existing studies on the impacts of voter turnout: without making efforts to deliver 
policy benefits, particularly when ‘attentive’ publics care much about them, incumbents 
will be seen as shirking constituency services, not caring about their electorate, or even 
breaking campaign pledges. This damages their reelection prospects.
  In sum, even after controlling for every possible observable variable and adding 
municipality-specific fixed-effects, it is unreasonable to assume that voter turnout is ex-
ogenous. Rather, voter turnout has impacts on policy outcomes, precisely because it is a 
function of unobservable electoral processes taking place until voters decide whether to 
go to the polling stations. In other words, paradoxically, voter turnout affects the delivery 
of benefits because of the presence of omitted variables.No. 379, 2009
5
Why Rainfall Is an Effective Instrument
We attempt to cope with this problem of omitted variables using a standard econometric 
tool, which is to exploit an instrumental variable and run a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regression. Our instrument  it Z  is measured in terms of hourly rainfall statistics for each 
municipality on each voting day. We assume two standard assumptions for the validity 
of instruments. First, it has a sufficiently strong correlation with voter turnout ( it X ). A 
standard rule of thumb is that an F-test statistic is greater than 10, which is clearly the 
case in our study. Second, it should be uncorrelated with the error term ( it ε ), which 
includes the unobservable systematic component ( it φ ) discussed in the previous section. 
The second assumption is justifiable, because weather conditions on a specific day in a 
specific municipality are unrelated to political interactions before the voting day. It is also 
unreasonable to assume that the government will study an election-day weather map 
while compiling a budget.
  To obtain a consistent estimate by running a two-stage least square (2SLS) regres-
sion, Dunning (2008) argues that we need to impose a third assumption, which he calls 
the assumption of ‘homogeneous partial effects’.2 This assumption has not been carefully 
tested in existing empirical studies using 2SLS regressions. In the following, we carefully 
discuss the validity of this assumption in our study, by following the notation of Dunning 
(2008).
  To begin with, we conceptually divide voter turnout into 
) 2 ( ) 1 (
i t i t it X X X + ≡ , where 
) 1 (
it X  is the component of voter turnout not influenced by rainfall and 
) 2 (
it X  is the com-
ponent of voter turnout influenced by it.3 In other words, we assume  ( ) 0 ,
) 1 ( = i t it Z X Cov  
but  ( ) 0 ,
) 2 ( ≠ i t it Z X Cov . As we discussed in the previous section, theoretically relevant 
variations in voter turnout are a function of unobservable electoral politics before the 
voting day. Thus, we are interested in estimating the impact of 
) 1 (
it X  on  it Y . Our instru-
ment, however, is correlated with another component of voter turnout, 
) 2 (
it X .
  Then, the question is whether a 2SLS regression using  it Z  as an instrument can 
produce a consistent estimate of 
) 1 (
it X  on  it Y . Dunning (2008) suggests that this is 
possible, as long as the assumption of ‘homogeneous partial effects’ is satisfied. It is an 
assumption that the impact of 
) 1 (
it X  and that of 
) 2 (
it X  are homogenous. Formally, we 
need to assume that the model (1) is equivalent to the following model.




1           (2)
The condition under which these two models (1) and (2) are equivalent is obviously 
( ) β β β = = 2 1 . 
  In Dunning’s discussion of possible violation of this assumption, he refers to the 
study of how income affects political attitudes (Doherty, Gerber and Green 2006; here-6
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inafter referred to as DGG), where lottery winning by survey respondents was utilised 
as an instrumental variable. Dunning decomposes the overall income (an endogenous 
variable) into ordinary income (
) 1 (
i X ) and lottery income (
) 2 (
i X ), and he points out 
that their instrument is correlated with 
) 2 (
i X  but not with 
) 1 (
i X . He also indicates the 
possibility that  2 1 β β ≠  because ‘lottery winnings may be regarded by subjects as an 
unusual stream of windfall income and may influence attitudes differently than money 
earned through work’ (p. 291). Under these assumptions, even if 
) 2 (
i X  is truly exog-
enous, a 2SLS regression does not produce consistent estimates that DGG intended to 
produce. Specifically, when  ( ) 0 ,
) 2 ( ) 1 ( = i i X X Cov , 2SLS asymptotically estimates the 
impact of lottery income on attitude (i.e.,  2 β ), which is not DGG’s interest. When 
( ) 0 ,
) 2 ( ) 1 ( ≠ i i X X Cov , it asymptotically estimates a mixture of  1 β  and  2 β , which may 
also not be what DGG intend to study. One critical assumption, which requires DGG’s 
study to produce an estimate of their quantity of interest ( 1 β ), is that the effect of income 
on attitudes is constant regardless of sources of income.
  In our case, we consider that it is reasonable to accept this assumption because the 
component of turnout influenced by rainfall is very small and unobservable for policy-mak-
ers who influence the amount of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.4 In DGG’s study, on 
the contrary, the component of income influenced by a lottery is (potentially) large and 
clearly observable for respondents who report their political attitudes. Below, we explain 
why this difference matters. 
  Suppose that there are two municipalities, which are identical with respect to all 
relevant (observable and unobservable) characteristics. They even have the same level 
of voter turnout, say 60 per cent. The only difference, however, is the composition of 
voter turnout, for instance, in the first municipality 
(1)
1 59.5%
t X =  and  % 5 . 0
) 2 (
1 = t X  
but  (1)
2 58.5%
t X =  and % 5 . 1
) 2 (
2 = t X  in the other. It is difficult to assume any systematic 
difference in policy outcomes between these municipalities, because policy makers typi-
cally cannot observe or distinguish such a tiny difference between  % 5 . 0
) 2 (
1 = t X  and 
% 5 . 1
) 2 (
2 = t X , even though  it X  is clearly observed and published.
  Note that if policy makers have sufficient resources and capability to monitor in-
dividual-level voting behavior (Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005), they may be able to identify 
who turned out and for whom they cast their ballot. This does not imply, however, that 
they can distinguish between 
) 1 (
it X  and 
) 2 (
it X  in each municipality. It is very difficult, if 
not impossible, for them to verify whether those who voted did so because of the elec-
tion-day weather or for other reasons. In fact, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that 
policy makers even do not make efforts to identify a tiny portion of voters who go to the 
polling stations if and only if weather conditions are good (‘weather-induced voters’).
  Accordingly, we assume that politicians ignore the small and unobservable portion 7
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of voter turnout and make policy decisions based on the observed turnout, which is almost 
equal to the unobservable portion of politically relevant turnout. In other words, we as-
sume that when voter turnout marginally increases because of good weather, politicians 
treat it as if it is due to a change in systematic factors and, thus, increase the allocation of 
transfers. This behavioral assumption is conceptually similar to ‘Type I error’ in statistical 
inference.5
  By contrast, in the case of DGG, the subjects are surveyed respondents who can 
clearly identify whether their income in the past year is mainly from their ordinary income 
sources or from the lottery. The amount of lottery income is zero for almost all individuals, 
but this component is fairly large for lottery winners. Furthermore, as Dunning argues, 
the effect of having a disposable income of US$80,000 per year from ordinary sources and 
having the same amount of total income with an extraordinary large proportion of lottery 
income (say, US$20,000 from ordinary sources and US$60,000 from lottery) are expected 
to be different. This is because individuals know which component of their income can be 
directly or indirectly influenced by government policy (for example, through taxes, direct 
payments and deductions, and policies affect employment and business conditions).
  In sum, rainfall is an effective instrument to estimate the impact of voter turnout 
not only because it is correlated with one portion of voter turnout and uncorrelated with 
other omitted political variables, but also because the portion of turnout influenced by 
rainfall is small and unidentifiable for policy-makers. 
Data and Variables
Now, let us introduce our data from Japan and specific variables for estimation. The 
outcome variable for our analysis ( it Y ) is the per capita amount of total transfers for mu-
nicipality-specific public projects and programs (in log).6 The total transfers include the 
following three components: the formulaically allocated portion of grant-in-aid (chihō 
kōfuzei futsū kōfukin), the grant-in-aid that is allocated discretionarily (chihō kōfuzei 
tokubetsu kōfukin), and the national treasury disbursement (kokko shishutsukin), which 
are project-based subsidies. We use total transfers because it is difficult to estimate the 
overall political effects by using program-specific or type-specific transfers. (For discussions 
about the measurement issue, see Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder 2002:769; Horiuchi 
and Saito 2003:674–5). 
  We use the average per capita transfers throughout inter-election years when incum-
bents elected in the previous general election could exert influence on budget-making.7 
Specifically, our dependent variable covers transfers in the fiscal years (FY) 1991–1993 8
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for the 1990 election, FY 1994–1996 for the 1993 election, FY 1997–2000 for the 1996 
election, and FY 2001–2003 for the 2000 election.
  The causal variable ( it X ) is voter turnout in the most recent 2000 Lower House 
election.8 The Lower House elections included in our data-set are the last two elections 
before the electoral reform of 1994 (that is, the 1990 and 1993 elections) and the first 
two elections after the reform (that is, the 1996 and 2000 elections). The 1990 and 1993 
elections were held under the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, while the 
latter two elections were held under a combination of the single member district (SMD) 
system and the closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. Since the purpose of 
this paper is not to identify how the impacts of voter turnout on pork-allocation strategies 
changed before and after the electoral reform, we pool all data for our analysis.9 Arguably, 
the changing dynamics of Japanese politics during the 1990s suggest a number of other 
unobservable variables correlated with voter turnout and policy outcomes — different 
mechanisms of inter-party and intra-party politics, changes in issues at stakes, heteroge-
neous motivations for individual candidates, etc. It is important to note, however, 2SLS 
produces consistent estimates as long as our rainfall instrument is uncorrelated with such 
changes in Japanese politics. This is undoubtedly true.
  The per capita amount of total transfers ( it Y ) is determined by pre-determined 
covariates ( 1 − it W ) other than voter turnout ( it X ). The first two variables are political 
— the number of seats per capita (in log) and the number of candidates per district 
magnitude in the most recent Lower House elections. Since our panel data set consists 
of pre- and post-reform periods, it is necessary to include these variables to control for 
essential aspects of electioneering activities. We think that these district-level variables are 
correlated with the density of mobilisation activities during the campaign period, and 
thus with both voter turnout and distributive policy outcomes, as we discussed in Section 
2.10
  An important set of variables, which we must include in our analysis using Japanese 
municipality-level local finance data, is the municipality fiscal strength index (zaisei-ryoku 
shisū) and its squared term (Chihō Zaisei Chōsa Kenkyū Kai, Various years).11 This index 
is devised by the Japanese government to appraise formulaic allocation of the grant-in-
aid (or general transfers) to each municipality. Therefore, it must be correlated with total 
transfers per capita. Specifically, the larger the value of this index, the stronger a munici-
pality’s ability to raise revenues through local taxes, and thus the lower the amount of 
intergovernmental transfers received. Since the index reflects a number of demographic 
and geographical variables, such as the total population, the composition of population 
by age groups, and each municipality’s area size, we do not add these additional demo-
graphic and geographical variables in our analysis.9
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  We also add fixed effects ( i α ) in our model to control for observable and un-
observable factors that are municipality-specific and time-invariant, that is, relatively 
constant within each municipality for the period of our investigation. For instance, some 
portion of the subsidy items is allocated to compensate for residents living in proxim-
ity to not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) facilities, such as nuclear and non-nuclear power 
plants. Other demographic, economic, social, historical, or cultural factors can also be 
controlled for as long as they are time-invariant. Unobservable factors of this type may 
include intergovernmental legal and administrative relationships, political culture, and 
historical experience. Furthermore, by running fixed-effect regressions, we can control 
for any geographical and topographic feature of municipalities, which may be correlated 
with voter turnout and rainfall, our instrumental variable.
  Finally, we add period-specific dummy variables, which are intended to control for 
inter-temporal nationwide differences in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. For instance, 
as we noted, our data include the periods before and after the 1994 electoral reform. 
The overall budget allocation plan may also be different across years depending on mac-
roeconomic conditions and the overall political climate in each year.
  Even with all these control variables and fixed effects, as we discussed earlier, there 
should be politically relevant but unobservable variables excluded from analysis. To cope 
with this problem, we exploit election-day precipitation data to serve an important role in 
our analysis.12 Through our preliminary analysis, we found that a dummy variable, which 
is coded ‘1’ if a municipality recorded three millimetres or more of rainfall between 6am 
and 3pm on the day of each Lower House election and ‘0’ otherwise, exhibits a very 
large effect on voter turnout.
  In Section 3, we already discussed why rainfall is expected to be a valid instrument 
to estimate the impact of voter turnout on policy outcomes. Due to the following three 
important institutional reasons, we think that our Japanese data are particularly valid 
for the purpose of this study. First of all, in Japan, voting typically takes place on Sun-
day. Therefore, weather conditions affect opportunity cost calculations among citizens 
— whether or not to go outdoors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that quite a few of the 
citizens are discouraged from going to the polling stations and decide to stay home when 
it rains (for example, Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 2003).
  Second, unlike other democracies where candidates and parties keep on mobilising 
voters until polling stations close, neither candidates nor political parties in Japan are al-
lowed to deploy any campaign activity on the polling day. The media are also expected to 
be neutral (and quiet) until the polling stations close. Thus, given the absence of political 
mobilisation efforts on the voting day, a short-run exogenous stimulus such as weather 
conditions is a plausible variable that is in isolation of other variables affecting a turnout 10
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rate. In other words, we can safely assume that there is no other systematic political vari-
able on the voting day.
  Finally, in our panel data, there is indeed a substantial variation in the amount of 
rainfall within each municipality across elections. Unlike elections in the United States, 
which take place in fixed intervals, the timing of Japan’s Lower House elections is not 
fixed. The prime minister can dissolve the Lower House and call a general election any 
time before the four-year term expires. This means that there can be a (potential) seasonal 
variation of elections when panel data that include multiple Lower House elections are 
used. In our case, the Lower House elections were held in February 1990 (winter), July 
1993 (summer), October 1996 (fall) and June 2000 (rainy season before summer), and 
nearly half of the municipalities have such variations across these elections. This intra-
municipality variation is critical, as an instrumental variable in fixed-effect regressions 
should retain adequate variation after the fixed-effect transformation. If it does not vary 
significantly across years within a municipality, it tends to show an insignificant effect 
on voter turnout, thereby introducing serious bias due to the use of ‘weak instruments’ 
(Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).
Results 
Using the variables introduced in Section 4, we run three regression models.13 The first 
is an ordinary least square (OLS) regression without employing our instrumental vari-
able. We consider OLS estimates as biased due to the omission of variables concerning 
politics before the voting day. We use it, however, to produce a conventional estimate and 
to examine how the coefficient of voter turnout will change by using the instrumental 
variable.
  The other two models are two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions with the rainfall 
instrumental variable. While the second model includes all observations, the third model 
excludes municipalities where our rainfall dummies are either 0 or 1 for all the voting days 
in our study. The idea is equivalent to the non-parametric preprocessing of data based on 
matching (Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart 2007). In our third model using pre-processed data, 
each municipality has at least one observation with rainfall and another without rainfall. 
In other words, all municipalities in the third model have intra-municipality variations 
in the instrumental variable. Balancing our data in this manner (and dropping causally 
irrelevant municipalities) is more likely to produce consistent estimates of the effects of 
rainfall on voter turnout.
  The total number of observations (for our first and second models without data 
pre-processing) is 12,620, which is 3,155 municipalities multiplied by four elections.14 11
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Descriptive statistics for variables used in this study are shown in Table 1, which include 
those based on all observations (N = 12,620) and on pre-processed observations (N = 
5,940). Since all the observations dropped by pre-processing are municipalities without 
rainfall on all the four voting days, the probability of having rainfall is obviously higher 
in the pre-processed data (27.6 per cent) than the complete data (13.8 per cent. More 
importantly, however, the distributions of other variables are quite similar between the two 
data-sets. This is unsurprising because whether municipalities are dropped from analysis is 
random by nature and thus uncorrelated with any of these variables. This similarity also 
means that we do not need to be seriously concerned about selection bias in our third 
model.
  Table 2 shows the results of three, fixed-effect regressions (second-stage).15 In the 
first OLS regression, the coefficient of voter turnout is small (0.052) and insignificant at 
any conventional level. In the other two models using the rainfall instrumental variable, 
this effect is much larger (1.744 in Model 2 and 2.366 in Model 3) and statistically highly 
significant. The effect is particularly large after dropping observations which are causally 
irrelevant in our 2SLS regressions. From these results, we conclude that the effect of voter 
turnout on per capita intergovernmental transfers is positive, large, and highly significant. 
We will interpret the substantial magnitude of its effect shortly after examining the results 
of first-stage regressions, which are shown in Table 3. 
  In the first-stage regressions, we are mainly interested in the effects of our instru-
mental variable. Similar to previous studies, the rain dummy shows small negative effects. 
Specifically, voter turnout drops by 1.1 percentage points in municipalities that recorded 
3 millimetres or more of rain (Model 3). The effects are highly significant. The econo-
metric literature suggests that the F-test statistic of an excluded instrument (or a set of 
instruments) should reach roughly ten in the context of a single endogenous regressor 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). Otherwise, the 2SLS estimates suffer from the problem of 
‘weak instruments’. In our cases, the test statistics are 95.11 in Model 2 and 118.43 in 
Model 3. There is no doubt that our rainfall instrument is sufficiently strong.
  Finally, let us also evaluate the substantive effects of voter turnout on per capita 
transfers based on a simple post-estimation analysis. The (weighted) average of voter 
turnout during the period of investigation is 64.2 per cent (in all data) and 64.3 per cent 
(in pre-processed data). The standard deviations are 0.093 and 0.092, respectively. The 
(weighted) average per capita total transfers (in log) is 4.401 (in all data; 81.53 thousand 
Japanese Yen) and 4.333 (in pre-processed data; 76.19 thousand Japanese Yen). Using 
these figures as benchmarks, we evaluate how much the amount of transfers will increase 
if voter turnout increases from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above the mean. The results are shown in Table 4.12
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The estimated effect based on the OLS regression is almost nil. The per capita transfers only 
increase by about 800 Japanese Yen, which is less than a one per cent increase (81.13 to 81.93 
thousands). By contrast, the 2SLS regressions suggest quite large effects of voter turnout on 
per capita transfers. The total amount of transfers increases by about 30 thousand Japanese 
Yen (26.68 thousands in all data and 33.51 thousands in pre-processed data). In terms of 
the percentage increase, it is 38.5 per cent (69.28 to 95.96 thousands) in our complete 
sample and 54.7 per cemt (61.25 to 94.76 thousands) in the pre-processed sample. The 
substantially large and positive estimates in the 2SLS regressions also imply that, in terms 
of the distributive benefits voters receive, the difference between municipalities with high 
voter turnout and those with low voter turnout is large and significant. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the impact of political participation on policy outcomes by using 
Japanese municipality-level data of voter turnout and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. 
After discussing the necessary methodological issues, we estimated marginal effects of 
voter turnout by employing a highly effective instrumental variable based on election-day 
rainfall data. The results suggest that the act of voting — the simplest, the most popular, 
the least expensive, but the most essential model of political participation in democracy 
— does indeed bring about sizable differences in policy outcomes. Municipalities with 
high voter turnout tend to receive significantly larger benefits than municipalities with 
low voter turnout.
  Our analysis suggests that, as far as our Japanese case is concerned, the responsiveness 
of legislators to policy needs of voters is indeed contingent on the level of voter turnout. 
In the words of Japan’s former prime minister (see the preamble of this paper), delivery 
of policy benefits that are commensurate to the level of participation may be nothing 
more than an example of how democracy actually works. However, as Lijphart (1997) 
lamented, unequal benefits based on unequal participation still remains ‘democracy’s 
unresolved dilemma’.
 
*Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, and various other seminars and workshops. We are grateful to Kenichi Ariga, 
Gary Cox, Glenndale Cornelio, Justin Fox, Matthew Gentzkow, Kosuke Imai, Masami Imai, 
John Londregan, Matthew McCubbins, Kenneth McElwain, Ryota Natori, Steven Reed, 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frances Rosenbluth, Ken Scheve, Susan Stokes, Keiko Tamada, and 
other participants in those seminars and workshops for their helpful comments. We thank 
Takashi Takeda for providing municipality location data, Kuniaki Nemoto and Kenichi 
Tamura for helping us collect local government finance data, and the Zengin Foundation for 
Studies on Economics and Finance for financial support. Saito also gratefully acknowledges 
financial support from the Yale Council for East Asian Studies.13
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max
	
All observations for Models (1) and (2)
Total Transfers Per Capita (in log)  4.401  0.788  1.985  8.837 
Voter Turnout ( per cent)  0.642  0.093  0.399  0.981 
Rain Dummy  0.138  0.345  0  1 
Seats Per Capita (in log)  1.366  0.384  0.752  2.247 
Candidates Per Seat  3.071  1.391  1.2  8 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index  0.727  0.280  0.040  2.273 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index (squared)  0.607  0.423  0.002  5.168
Selected	observations	for	Model	(3)
Total Transfers Per Capita (in log)  4.333  0.769  2.184  8.837 
Voter Turnout ( per cent)  0.643  0.092  0.409  0.981 
Rain Dummy  0.276  0.447  0  1 
Seats Per Capita (in log)  1.357  0.372  0.752  2.247 
Candidates Per Seat  3.094  1.422  1.2  8 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index  0.767  0.286  0.040  2.257 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index (squared)  0.669  0.448  0.002  5.093
Note: The number of observations is 12,620 for Models (1) and (2) and 5,940 for Model (3). All 
observations are weighted by the municipality population.
Table 2: Regression Results
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Variables	 OLS	 2SLS	 2SLS
Voter Turnout ( per cent)  0.052  1.744  2.366 
  (0.038)  (0.421)  (0.446) 
Seats Per Capita (in log)  0.083  0.041  0.014 
  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
Candidates Per Seat  0.014  0.007  0.016 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index  -4.256  -4.021  -3.922 
  (0.089)  (0.114)  (0.163) 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index (squared)  1.157  1.128  1.262 
  (0.042)  (0.047)  (0.074) 
1993 Election Dummy  0.125  0.228  0.290 
  (0.004)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
1996 Election Dummy  0.287  0.534  0.615 
  (0.009)  (0.062)  (0.065) 
2000 Election Dummy  0.187  0.388  0.456 
  (0.009)  (0.051)  (0.054)
The	number	of	observations	 12,620	 12,620	 5,940	
The	number	of	panels	(municipalities)	 3,155	 3,155	 1,485	
R2	 0.719	 0.661	 0.592	
(Mean	Squared	Error)0.5	 0.114	 0.125	 0.144
 
Note: The dependent variable is total transfers per capita (in log). Standard errors are in parentheses. All 
regressions are weighted by the municipality population and include municipality fixed effects. The 1990 
Election is a base category for election dummies. Model (3) excludes municipalities, which did not have 
rainfalls in all the four Lower House elections. 14
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Table 3: First-Stage Regression Results
	 	 (2)	 (3)	
Variables	 	 2SLS	 2SLS
Seats Per Capita (in log)    0.024  0.021 
    (0.002)  (0.003) 
Candidates Per Seat    0.004  0.003 
    (0.000)  (0.001) 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index    -0.152  -0.107 
    (0.024)  (0.033) 
Municipality Fiscal Strength Index (squared)    0.022  -0.006 
    (0.011)  (0.015) 
1993 Election Dummy    -0.059  -0.054 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
1996 Election Dummy    -0.146  -0.143 
    (0.002)  (0.003) 
2000 Election Dummy    -0.118  -0.114 
    (0.002)  (0.003) 
Rain Dummy    -0.009  -0.011 
    (0.001)  (0.001)
The number of observations    12,620  5,940 
The number of panels (municipalities)    3,155  1,485 
R2    0.820  0.821 
(Mean Squared Error)0.5    0.030  0.030 
F test statistic of an excluded instrument    95.11  118.43
Note: The dependent variable is voter turnout ( per cent). Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions 
are weighted by the municipality population and include municipality fixed effects. The 1990 Election is a 
base category for election dummies. Model (3) excludes municipalities, which did not have rainfalls in all the 
four Lower House elections.
Table 4: Marginal Effects of Voter Turnout
	 	 Models	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)
Total Transfers Per Capita (in log, mean)  4.40  4.40  4.33 
Estimated Coefficient of Voter Turnout  0.05  1.74  2.37 
Voter Turnout (mean,  per cent)  0.64  0.64  0.64 
Voter Turnout (standard deviation, SD)  0.09  0.09  0.09 
A. Predicted Total Transfers Per Capita (mean - 1 SD)  81.13  69.28  61.25 
B. Predicted Total Transfers Per Capita (mean)  81.53  81.53  76.19 
C. Predicted Total Transfers Per Capita (mean + 1 SD)  81.93  95.96  94.76 
Difference = C − A  0.80  26.68  33.51
Note: The means and standard deviations are weighted by the municipality population. The measurement 
unit of predicted total transfers per capita is 1,000 Japanese Yen.15
No. 379, 2009
Notes
1  Party President’s address at the Liberal Democratic Party’s Council of Prefectural Chief Secretaries 
on 19 May, 1983.
2   Dunning distinguishes his argument from recent discussions in the literature on ‘local average 
treatment effects’ or ‘complier average causal effects’ (for example, Imbens and Angrist 1994), 
which are heterogeneous effects of a treatment variable across individuals or units. Dunning assumes 
that the coefficients are common to all units, while focusing on causal heterogeneity across portions 
of a treatment variable. In this study, we follow Dunning’s assumption. Similar to Dunning, we also 
present our arguments based on a standard regression framework rather than a potential outcome 
framework. 
3   Depending on theoretical interests, one may further divide 
) 1 (
it X  into several sub-components, which 
may or may not be observable. Observable components could include, for instance, the number 
of votes cast for the ruling coalition and the opposition. Unobservables could include the number 
of ‘core’ supporters for both the ruling and the opposition parties. In this study, however, we are 
interested in the average effect of voter turnout (vis-à-vis abstention), which can be considered a 
mixture of heterogeneous effects on various sub-components of 
) 1 (
it X  on fiscal transfers.
4   The small but significant effects of rainfall on turnout are already reported in the existing studies 
(Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007; Knack 1994; Tamada 2006).
5   We do not assume  0 2 = β , which is equivalent to assuming that policy makers can detect a very 
small portion of 
) 2 (
it X  in  it X  and do not reward those ‘weather-induced voters’.
6   Our data are based on the account settlements (Chihō Zaisei Chōsa Kenkyū Kai, Various years). The 
municipality population at the end of the fiscal year, which begins on 1 April, is from Kokudo Chiri 
Kyōkai (Various years).
7   We prefer to use this dependent variable, instead of each fiscal year’s per capita transfers, because 
taking the average for several years can minimize stochastic factors within each municipality.
8   All the electoral variables used in this study are adopted from Mizusaki (1993, 1996, 2000).
9   Such a study examining how the electoral reform changed the causal effects of voter turnout on 
policy outcomes is both theoretically and substantially valuable. Nevertheless, we do not pursue it 
in this study, because we do not have sufficient variations in key variables within each municipality 
if we divide our data into pre-reform and post-reform periods. Doing so would result in further 
methodological complications. Reliable rainfall data sets at the municipal level exist only after 1989. 
After the 2000 election, there has been a sequence of drastic municipal mergers in Japan, which 
makes us difficult to compile a valid panel dataset.
10   Horiuchi and Saito (2003) find a positive and highly significant effect of the number of seats divided 
by the size of constituency on the per capita amount of total transfers in Japan.
11   Since the relationship between the index and the per capita amount of total transfers may be non-
linear, we add its squared term. Our preliminary analysis suggests the validity of this non-linearity 
assumption.
12   The rainfall data are retrieved from CD-ROMs published from Kishō Gyōmu Shien Sentā (Various 
years). The precipitation is measured and collected on the hourly basis over the entire Japanese 
archipelago, by utilising both radars and rain gauges. The original data are recorded in a lattice 
format at approximately 5 km intervals, to each of which latitude and longitude information is 
attached. The rainfall data are then merged to municipal observations by matching geographic 
location of city halls and town halls to each of the rainfall lattices (Takeda 2003).
13   In order to cope with a possible problem of heteroskedasticity, all the three regressions are weighted 
by the municipality population size, which exhibits a wide variation ranging from less than 200 to 
1.5 millions. Note that our dependent variable is denominated by the municipal population and our 
key independent variable is denominated by the total number of eligible voters, which are equivalent 
to (automatically) registered voters in the case of Japan.
14   Due to a small number of municipal amalgamations (50 cases of mergers between the 1990 election 
and the end date of FY 2003), the number of municipalities is not exactly constant during the period 
of investigation. We thus use the pre-merger municipal population as a weight and make a balanced 16
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panel before data analysis.
15   The coefficients of other control (included exogenous) variables also tend to show highly significant 
effects with expected signs. We do not, however, provide interpretation to these coefficients because 
they are not main quantities of our interests.
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